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Abstract
This paper proposes and empirically tests a theory of entrepreneurial inno-
vation in order to explain its high degree of concentration in space and time.
In the model, a successful entrepreneurial project is the result of a search and
matching process between entrepreneurs looking for funds and capitalists looking
for new ideas to nance. The resulting strategic complementarity between them
gives rise to a multiplier e¤ect, whereby any exogenous shock has a magnied
e¤ect on the process of innovation. Moreover, if complementarity is su¢ ciently
strong, multiple equilibria arise, which are characterized by di¤erent levels of
entrepreneurial activity. Using data from the European and the US business an-
gels markets for the period 1996-2010, we show that (i) a complementarity exists
between business angels and the entrepreneurial projects submitted to them, and
that (ii) the result of multiple equilibria is empirically plausible.
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1 Introduction
Suppose you think you have a promising idea for a new business venture but you nd
it hard to nance your project from banks or other conventional sources of capital,
because of the high degree of uncertainty associated with your project and because of
the lack of good collateral. You might then want to turn to other agents, specialized in
screening and evaluating innovative business projects exactly like yours. If they judge
your project valuable, these agents decide to provide you with the necessary capital, as
well as technical and managerial advice, in exchange for an equity stake in the project.
In the standard economics terminology, you are referred to as the entrepreneur, the
specialized agents as the capitalists (such as venture capitalists or business angels),
and the whole process is usually described as one of entrepreneurial innovation.
Two characteristics are salient when we observe the process of entrepreneurial in-
novation. The rst, well-known, characteristic is its high degree of geographic clusteri-
zation. In the US, for example, roughly half of rms nanced by venture capitalists are
located in three cities only, San Francisco, Boston, and New York (Chen et Al., 2009).
Similar patterns of concentration can be documented for Europe and Asia: think,
for instance, of the entrepreneurial clusters in Herzliya (Israel) or in the Guangdong
province (China).
The second, probably less known, feature is the higher volatility over time of en-
trepreneurial investments with respect to all other investments. In Figure 1, we have
depicted the volatility of investments in xed capital and in R&D for the period 1995-
2010 in both the US and Europe.1 The pronounced volatility that we observe in Figure
1 almost disappears when we compare it with the one observed on the investments pro-
vided by venture capitalists (VCs) and private equity (PE) funds devoted to seed and
start-ups, which is what we show in Figure 2 for both the US and Europe in the same
period.2 ;3
INSERT FIGURES 1 AND 2 HERE
1Volatility is measured as percentage deviation of investment components from their Hodrick-
Prescott trends with smoothing parameters set at 6.25 (see Ravn and Uhlig, 2002).
2Since we are here interested in investments devoted to innovative projects, we limit our attention
to the fraction of VC investments on seed and start-ups.
3In both gures the aggregate "Europe" refers to EU15 plus Poland, Norway, Switzerland, Russia,
Estonia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia.
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A look at Figure 2 clearly suggests a pattern of "boom and bust" of entrepreneurial
investments. In particular, both the dotcom bubble (and the subsequent bubble burst),
as well as the e¤ect of the economic crisis initiated in 2007 are clearly visible from the
gure. The higher volatility of entrepreneurial investments arises even when we restrict
the attention to those provided by business angels (BAs), as in Figure 3.4 ;5
INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE
The goal of this paper is twofold. On the one hand, we propose a theory of en-
trepreneurial innovation which is able to explain both the space clusterization and the
high volatility over time that we have documented in the previous gures. On the other
hand, we try to validate empirically our main theoretical claims against the available
data on entrepreneurial innovation.
We construct a dynamic, partial-equilibriummodel where an entrepreneurial project
(or an innovative, start-up rm) is the outcome of a process of search and matching
between the two main actors of the innovative process: those who come up with new
ideas, that we call entrepreneurs (or simply innovators); and those who screen and
select the most valuable ideas deserving nancing funds, that we call capitalists (or
simply nanciers). An innovation is the result of a successful matching between an
entrepreneur and a capitalist.6
In our model, entrepreneurs are willing to spend their time and intellectual resources
to discover a new idea only if they have a chance to meet a capitalist. On the other
hand, capitalists are willing to spend their time and intellectual resources to evaluate
the protability of ideas only if they have the chance to meet valuable entrepreneurs.
More generally, the return to becoming an entrepreneur (capitalist) is higher, the higher
the number of capitalists (entrepreneurs) in the market. Hence, and as usual in the class
4Business angels refer to wealthy individuals that invest their own funds in entrepreneurial ventures,
di¤erently from VCs, which instead gather funds from insitutional investors, such as pension funds.
Because of that, the amount invested in each project by a BA is, on average, considerably lower
than the one invested by a VC. BAs and VCs, however, share the following crucial feature: they are
expected to contribute to the project not only with nancial investments but also with managerial
and technical expertise (Gompers and Lerner, 1999).
5For lack of data on BAs, we have restricted the time span of the series to the decade 2001-2010.
Moreover, and for the same reason, Europe here refers to EU15 plus Norway, Poland, Switzerland and
Russia.
6A more thorough justication of this modeling strategy is provided in Section 2.
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of search and matching models (Diamond, 1982, Kiyotaki andWright, 1993), a strategic
complementarity exists between entrepreneurs and capitalists, in that, at equilibrium,
the number of entrepreneurs devoting to innovation is an increasing function in the
number of capitalists, and viceversa.
The presence of a thick market externality across entrepreneurs and capitalists has
a number of interesting theoretical implications. The rst is the existence of a mul-
tiplier e¤ect in entrepreneurial innovation, whereby the e¤ect of an exogenous shock
on the pace of innovation is magnied by the self-reinforcing nature of the interaction
between the two sides of the market for ideas. This multiplier e¤ect may contribute
to explain the relatively higher volatility of entrepreneurial investments that we have
documented in Figures 2 and 3. In this respect, animal spirits matter in the process
of entrepreneurial innovation, in the sense that this process may be a¤ected by waves
of enthusiasm and/or pessimism.
A second implication is that, if strategic complementarities across entrepreneurs and
capitalists are su¢ ciently strong (which occurs when the assumed aggregate matching
function exhibits increasing returns to scale), the model may admit a multiplicity of
equilibria, each characterized by a di¤erent pace of entrepreneurial activity. These
equilibria can be ranked from the lowest to the highest number of innovations (matches)
produced by the economy. Welfare is maximized at the equilibrium characterized by
the highest number of matches. All other equilibria are sub-optimal and are the result
of a coordination failure across the market participants (Diamond, 1982, Cooper and
John, 1988). Moreover, a "degenerate" equilibrium always exists in this economy, in
which the resources devoted to innovation are null. We call it "no-innovation trap".
The possibility of multiple equilibria may contribute to explain the well known
phenomenon of geographic clusterization of entrepreneurial innovation that we have
mentioned above. In principle, even two identical economies in terms of fundamentals
may persistently diverge in their innovative performance: some economies may converge
towards a "high entrepreneurial activity" equilibrium, others may be trapped into a
slow or even stagnant pattern of entrepreneurial activity. Again, the model suggests
that animal spirits matter in the process of innovation, in the sense that, whether a
high or a low activity equilibrium is reached depends on a self-fullling mechanism
triggered by entrepreneursand capitalistsexpectations.
In the second part of the paper, we test empirically the main theoretical predic-
tions of the model using data on innovative projects nanced by business angels. The
rst claim is the existence of a strategic complementarity between entrepreneurs and
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capitalists. To test it, we hand-collect yearly data for the period 1996-2010 across a
number of European countries plus the US, on (i) the number of business angels (cap-
italists), (ii) the number of projects submitted to them (potential entrepreneurs), (iii)
the number of deals (successful matches). The estimated aggregate matching function,
which takes the number of projects and angels as inputs and the number of deals as
output, conrms that, within countries, there exists a statistically and economically
signicant complementarity between the number of business angels looking for inno-
vative projects and the number of projects submitted to them. We then verify the
empirical plausibility of the multiple equilibria by testing the returns to scale of the
matching function. In the most reliable estimated model, the scale elasticity of the
matching function is slightly above unity, suggesting that multiple equilibria are not
unlikely.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related lit-
erature. Section 3 introduces the theoretical framework, characterizes the stationary
equilibrium and proves the strategic complementarity between entrepreneurs and cap-
italists. Section 4 derives the multiplier e¤ect. Section 5 discusses the possibility of
coordination failures in the innovation process and develops an example for illustrative
purposes. Section 6 carries out the empirical analysis. Section 7 discusses the policy
implications of the model and concludes with a few remarks. All proofs are relegated
to a technical appendix at the end of the manuscript.
2 Related Literature
This paper is related to the literature, initiated by Arrow (1962), on the market failures
associated with the process of innovation, and more particularly, with the process of
innovation nancing. Both microeconomic theory and empirical evidence have long
recognized the potential obstacles hidden in the process of nancing innovation, sug-
gesting that innovators may well be nancially constrained (for a review of the litera-
ture see, for instance, Hall and Lerner, 2010, and Hall, 2005). Theoretical arguments,
advanced to explain nancial market imperfections in this sector, range from transac-
tion costs to agency problems due to informational asymmetries between the innovator
(agent) and the nancier (principal).7
7While these aspects are common to any nancing relationship, a number of additional elements
suggest that nancing problems can be even more severe for innovative investments: innovations are
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In analogy with the labor market literature (Pissarides, 2000), we capture nancial
market imperfections via search theory. The matching process is a modeling tool
that is meant to represent succintly all frictions characterizing the process of nancing
innovation - such as information imperfections, or the entrepreneursand capitalists
heterogeneities in skills, location, beliefs etc. (Phelps, 2009). Moroever, a decentralized
market for innovation allows us to describe the realistic situation in which there may
exist, at the same time, promising ideas which are not nanced ("unemployed" ideas)
and unutilized capital searching for good ideas to nance.
The idea of modeling entrepreneurial innovation as a process of search and matching
is not new in the entrepreneurial nance literature. A few papers go deeper into the mi-
croeconomic foundations of the market frictions in the nancing of innovation (Silveira
and Wright, 2007, Silveira and Wright, 2010, Silveira and Amit, 2006, Chiu, Meh and
Wright, 2011). Others emphisize the contractual content of the relationship between
entrepreneurs and capitalists (Boadway et al., 2005, Keuschnigg, 2003, Inderst and
Muller, 2004, Michelacci and Suarez, 2004). Neither of these papers, however, focuses
on the complementary nature of this relationship, and on its implications to explain
the two stylized facts on entrepreneurial nance highlighted above. Obviously, because
of that, neither of them attempts to test empirically these theoretical predictions.
Finally, this paper is close to the literature attempting to explain the observed
geographic clusterization of the entrepreneurial process. Several explanations have
been proposed which are based on the existence of a network externality, such as input
sharing, labor market pooling or knowledge spillovers (see, for instance, Ja¤e et al.,
1993; Audretsch and Feldman, 1996; Chen et al., 2009). We here signal the presence
of an alternative positive network externality to rationalize the same phenomenon: the
one between entrepreneurs and capitalists.
uniqueevents, and the process aimed at producing them is an uncertain and largely unpredictable
economic activity.
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3 The Model
3.1 Innovation as a Search and Matching Process
The world is populated by a measure E of entrepreneurs and a measureK of capitalists
who must decide whether to participate or not in a fair of ideas.8 For simplicity, but
without any loss of generality, both agents have an identical linear utility function,
u (x) = x 8x 2 R+. Time is continuous, and new ideas arrive randomly to the entre-
preneurs according to a Poisson process with (exogenous) instantaneous probability .
In order for these raw entrepreneurial ideas to become marketable innovations however,
entrepreneurs need the (nancial and managerial) support of capitalists.
Once an entrepreneur has come up with a new idea, she has to decide whether to
pursue it by participating in the fair, or abandon it and wait for the next idea. To
pursue it, each entrepreneur has to pay a cost cE, representing the cost of developing
and submitting the project to the nanciers. This cost is stochastic and distributed ac-
cording to a (twice continuously di¤erentiable) cumulative distribution function F (cE)
in the support [0; cE]. If the entrepreneur pays cE, she acquires the right to participate
in the fair and hence, as we will see, the chance of matching the "right" capitalist and
implement her project. Cost cE can also be interpreted as an (inverse) measure of the
quality of the entrepreneurs project.
On the other hand, each capitalist sustains an entry cost cK to participate in the fair
of ideas (the cost of screening, evaluating and selecting the entrepreneurial projects).
This cost, which can be thought of as an inverse measure of each capitalists talent,
is also stochastic and distributed according to a (twice continuously di¤erentiable)
cumulative distribution function G (cK) in the support [0; cK ].9
To analyze the entry decisions of entrepreneurs and capitalists in the fair of ideas,
we now need to specify the potential benets that accrue to them if they pay the
entry fee. Let LE  E and LK  K denote, respectively, the endogenous number of
entrepreneurs and capitalists participating in the fair (that is, those that have paid their
respective entry cost). An entrepreneurial venture is the result of a process of successful
search and matching between an entrepreneur and a capitalist both attending the fair.
We capture this production process of new ideas via the following aggregate matching
8Probably, the theoretical framework closest to ours is the now classical "coconut model" by
Diamond (1982).
9One might alternatively interpret cE and cK as outside options, that is, as the opportunity costs
of devoting to entrepreneurship.
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function:
M = M (LE; LK) ; (1)
with @M=@Li > 0 and @2M=@L2i < 0 for i = E;K, implying positive and decreasing
marginal returns to both inputs. We also impose M (LE; 0) = M (0; LK) = 0, that
is, the absence of entrepreneurs or capitalists implies zero successful matches. No
further structure is imposed on the returns to scale of the matching function. The
instantaneous probability of matching for, respectively, entrepreneurs and capitalists
attending the fair, is then given by
E =
M
LE
and K =
M
LK
: (2)
The standard assumptions on the rst two derivatives of the matching function (that
will be veried empirically in Section 6) imply that @i=@Li < 0 and @i=@L i > 0
for i = E;K.10 That is to say, the matching probability for an entrepreneur decreases
with the number of entrepreneurs and increases with the number of capitalists (and
the same holds for capitalists).
For an entrepreneur, the value of waiting for a new idea is denoted by V 0E and
dened by the following asset equation:
rV 0E = 
cEZ
0
 
V 1E   V 0E   cE

dF (cE) ; (3)
where r is the exogenous riskless interest rate, cE is the highest cost for which there
is still entry (to be determined at equilibrium), and V 1E represents the expected payo¤
associated with the entrepreneurial venture for an entrepreneur (the lifetime return to
an entrepreneur attending the fair). This latter value is dened by
rV 1E = E
 
 + V 0E   V 1E

; (4)
where  represents total instantaneous prots originating from the innovation, and
 2 (0; 1) is the entrepreneursfraction of these prots. These asset equations have
the usual interpretations. Equation (3) tells us that, for an entrepreneur, the ow of
utility from waiting for a new idea is equal to the instantanous probability of a new
idea times the corresponding payo¤, which is given by the capital gain associated with
participating in the fair minus the entry cost. Equation (4) instead says that the ow
10This will be explicitly shown in the proof of Lemma 1.
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of utility from venturing into innovation is equal to the probability of a successful
matching with a capitalist times the payo¤ associated with this chance. Values V 0E
and V 1E can be alternatively interpreted as the value to an entrepreneur of being,
respectively, outside and inside the fair of ideas. Note that, in the two expressions
above, we have decided to focus directly on the steady state, as we have imposed
_V jE = 0 for j = 0; 1.
Two implicit assumptions in (4) are worth noticing. First, every match becomes a
successful innovation, that is to say, every venture-backed rm raises positive prots.
Indeed, observation suggests that only a small fraction of funded projects reaches
that stage (anecdotal evidence suggests that this fraction is below 20%). The second
assumption is that, once a successful matching has occurred, the entrepreneur goes
back to the initial "inventive" stage (say, by selling her idea -or patent- to a rm which
will start production). This endless circular process is meant to represent the so called
venture capital cycle described by Gompers and Lerner (1999).11 Of course, none of
these assumptions is necessary for any of our results.
Let us now turn to capitalists. The expected payo¤ associated with being a capi-
talist outside the fair is denoted by V 0K and dened by the following asset equation:
rV 0K =
cKZ
0
 
V 1K   V 0K   cK

dG (cK) ; (5)
where cK is the highest cost for which there is still entry for capitalists, and V
1
K repre-
sents the expected value from participating in the fair of ideas. This value is dened
by12
rV 1K = K

(1  )  + V 0K   V 1K

; (6)
where (1  )  is the capitalistsfraction of the prots prevailing in the market (again,
along the steady state it is _V iK = 0 for i = 0; 1).
Before analyzing the choice behavior of entrepreneurs and capitalists, let us briey
comment on two issues. First, the allocation of the innovation prots across entre-
preneurs and capitalists, as captured by the parameter , is here taken as exogenous.
This is not because we believe the contractual arrangement between entrepreneurs and
11In the business literature, an individual with such characteristics is sometimes referred to as a
serial entrepreneur. We prefer to portray it as a Schumpeterian entrepreneur, given its exclusive
dedication to innovation.
12The implicit assumption here is that each capitalist can enter into one and only one project at a
time, and that each entrepreneur needs one and only one capitalist.
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capitalists is uninteresting but simply because our focus is di¤erent.13 Secondly, in ex-
pression (6) we have implicitly supposed that the cost of nancing the entrepreneurial
project is null (so that the capitalistscontribution to the venture is technical and/or
managerial but not nancial). This is only to economize on parameters and simplify
calculations.
3.2 Complementarities in the Innovation Process
In general, two activities are complementary whenever the return from one activity
increases as the intensity of the other activity increases. Bringing this denition to our
context, we say that entrepreneurs and capitalists are complementary if the return from
attending the fair of ideas for an entrepreneur (capitalist) is increasing in the number
of capitalists (entrepreneurs) attending the fair. We now prove that this statement is
true in our model.
Let us focus on entrepreneurs rst. Their cost from attending the fair is distributed
according to F (cE) and is independent of the number of capitalists. Their benet, as-
sociated with the chance of a successful matching with a capitalist, is instead measured
by the di¤erence V 1E V 0E . Subtracting (3) from (4), and solving the resulting equation
for V 1E   V 0E , we obtain
V 1E   V 0E =
E + 
cEZ
0
cEdF (cE)
r + E + F (cE)
: (7)
Standard di¤erential calculus proves that the expression above is increasing in E,
and thus in LK . The intuition for this result is straightforward: the higher the number
of capitalists, the higher the matching probability for an entrepreneur, and hence the
higher her return from participating in the innovation process.
The same argument holds for capitalists. Their cost is independent of the number
of entrepreneurs, while their benet is measured by the di¤erence V 1K   V 0K . Again,
13An extensive literature has focused on optimal contracts between capitalists and entrepreneurs
(for instance in the presence of moral hazard and adverse selection): see, among others, Keuschnigg
(2003), Inderst and Muller (2004), Michelacci and Suarez (2004), Silveira and Wright (2007).
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solving the system made up of (5) and (6) for V 1K   V 0K , we obtain
V 1K   V 0K =
K (1  ) +
cKZ
0
cKdG (cK)
r + K +G (cK)
; (8)
which is increasing in K , and thus in LE. The two previous results are summarized
in the following
Lemma 1. Entrepreneurs and capitalists are complementary, in that the return
from attending the fair of ideas for an entrepreneur (capitalist) is increasing in the
number of capitalists (entrepreneurs) attending the fair.
We are now ready to characterize a stationary equilibrium for this economy.
3.3 The Stationary Equilibrium
We now consider the optimal entry decisions for both entrepreneurs and capitalists.
At each point in time, the choice of the E LE entrepreneurs who are outside the fair,
as to whether to pursue their project or abandon it, depends on the relative costs and
benets of the project. The cost cE is distributed according to F (cE), while the benet
is measured by the di¤erence V 1E   V 0E . There exists an inframarginal entrepreneur for
whom cE = V
1
E   V 0E . Substituting for the expression given in (7), we obtain
cE =
E + 
cEZ
0
cEdF (cE)
r + E + F (cE)
: (9)
All entrepreneurs whose entry cost is lower than cE nd it protable to participate
in the fair. The expression above links the threshold cost cE to the probability of
successful matching for entrepreneurs E, and hence to the number of entrepreneurs
and capitalists attending the fair, LE, LK : as an immediate implication of Lemma 1,
a higher LK and/or a lower LE leads to an increase in the probability of a successful
matching with a capitalist (E), which in turn causes an increase in the cuto¤ value
of the entry cost cE.
14
14Dene
H (cE ; E) =
E + 
cEZ
0
cEdF (cE)
r + E + F (cE)
  cE
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In analogy to the previous case, the chance of a successful matching with an en-
trepreneur is worth V 1K   V 0K to a capitalist. Given that the cost of this chance cK
is distributed according to G (cK), there exists an inframarginal capitalist for whom
cK = V
1
K   V 0K . Substituting for the expression given in (8), we obtain
cK =
K (1  )  +
cKZ
0
cKdG (cK)
r + K +G (cK)
: (10)
All capitalists whose entry cost is lower than cK nd it protable to participate in
the fair. This expression captures the positive relationship between K and cK .
Finally remind that, for both entrepreneurs and capitalists, the inows into the fair
of innovation must be equal to the outows along the steady state, that is
_LE =  (E   LE)F (cE)  LE  E = 0; (11)
and
_LK = (K   LK)G (cK)  LK  K = 0; (12)
where LE  E = LK  K = M . Equation (11) captures the evolution of entrepreneurs
over time. Along the steady state, the number of entrepreneurs deciding to participate
in the fair ( (E   LE)F (cE)) must equalize the number of entrepreneurs who have
successfully matched with capitalists and have thus returned to the waiting stage (LE 
E). An analogous interpretation can be given to (12).
Equation (11) can be interpreted as a positive relationship between LE and cE (for
any given value of LK). A higher value of cE implies greater entry in the market of
innovation. To maintain the steady state, the number of matches must correspondingly
increase. Hence, a higher value of LE (for a constant value of LK) is required for
equation (11) to hold. The same is true, mutatis mutandis, for equation (12) capturing
LK as a positive function of cK for given LE. We are now ready for the following
Denition. A stationary equilibrium for this economy is any 4-tuple (LE; LK ; cE; c

K)
that solves the four equations (9), (10), (11) and (12).
In equilibrium, the number of entrepreneurs venturing in innovative projects de-
pends on the number of capitalists deciding to back these projects, as this a¤ects the
as the implicit function of cE with respect to E . It is immediate to prove, via the implicit function
theorem, that dcE=dE > 0.
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chance of a successful matching. On the other hand, the number of capitalists devoting
their time and resources to screening and evaluating innovative projects depends on the
chances of encountering good potential entrepreneurs. This interdependence across en-
trepreneursand capitalistsbehavior along any stationary equilibrium is characterized
in the following
Theorem 1 At equilibrium, the number of entrepreneurs attending the fair of ideas is
an increasing function of the number of capitalists attending the fair, and viceversa:
dLi=dL i > 0 8i = E;K.
The result stated in Theorem 1 is a consequence of the complementarity between
entrepreneurs and capitalists that we have proven in Lemma 1. Intuitively, a higher
number of capitalists participating in the fair raises the chance of a successful matching
for an entrepreneur, it makes her participation to the fair more protable, and thus it
brings about an increase in the equilibrium number of entrepreneurs (and viceversa).
We can now call this complementarity strategic, as it is the result of endogenous and
interdependent entry choices of the two types of agents. The existence of this strategic
complementarity will be veried empirically in Section 6.
Finally, we close the section with a result "disciplining" the number of equilibria
admitted by this economy. We prove the following15
Theorem 2 If the matching function (1) is homogeneous of degree 1, the economy
admits one and only one stationary equilibrium.
In the next two sections, we will investigate the theoretical implications of the
strategic complementarity between entrepreneurs and capitalists both when the econ-
omy admits a multiplicity of stationary equilibria and when the equilibrium is unique.
We start with the latter.
4 The Multiplier E¤ect
Suppose that the matching function is homogenous of degree 1, and hence that the
equilibrium is unique. We now prove that the presence of strategic complementarities
15A similar result in a di¤erent model is provided by Diamond (1984).
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makes this equilibrium highly sensitive to disturbances. For illustrative purposes, say
that a negative shock hits this economy so that, for instance,  < 0 (meaning that, for
a whatever reason, entrepreneurs become less "creative"). This negative shock reduces
the payo¤ associated with the entrepreneurial activity and thus reduces the number
of entrepreneurs. This, however, is not the end of the story. The lower number of
entrepreneurs weakens the incentive to become capitalist, which in turn further lowers
the incentive to entrepreneurship. This process continues ad innitum, describing a
vicious circle whereby the aggregate response to the shock is stronger than the initial
instantaneous response. The strategic complementarity across the two main actors of
the innovation process magnies the initial e¤ect of the shock and gives rise to what
is usually referred to as a multiplier e¤ect.
More formally, dene Li (L i; ) as the (positively sloped) reaction function of
agents of type i with respect to the agents of type  i (for i = E;K), parameter-
ized by  2 R+ capturing any feature that a¤ects Li other than changes in L i. We
are now ready to state the following
Theorem 3 A multiplier e¤ect characterizes the process of entrepreneurial innovation,
in that the total equilibrium response of entrepreneurs and capitalists to an exogenous
shock is greater than the instantaneous response:
dLi
d
>
@Li
@
8i = E;K.
The e¤ect of an exogenous shock on the market of ideas is amplied by the strate-
gic complementarity across the two sides of the market for ideas. Hence, any factor
that a¤ects the entrepreneursor the capitalistspayo¤ has a big impact on the level
of innovative activity. This mutual, self-reinforcing, interaction between entrepreneurs
and capitalists may contribute to explain the extremely high volatility of entrepreneur-
ial investments that we have documented in Figures 2 and 3. To use a phrase from
Summers (1988), our entrepreneurial equilibrium is fragile, in the sense that it is po-
tentially subject to large uctuations in the level of activity. This suggests that animal
spirits may play a role in explaining the dynamics of entrepreneurial innovation. It
also suggests that even small temporary shocks may have long-lasting consequences on
the innovative process and, hence, on the overall economic performance.
The strength of the multiplier e¤ect depends on the thickness of the market of inno-
vation - as measured by the equilibrium number of entrepreneurs and capitalists - and
14
on the technological characteristics of the matching function. In particular, whether
the e¤ect of exogenous shocks on entrepreneurial activity increases or decreases as the
market of innovation becomes thicker depends on the degree of input complementarity
in the matching function - as measured by the cross-partial derivative of (1). Two
inputs are complementary when the marginal productivity of one input is increasing
in the use of the other input. In our context, this means that the impact of one addi-
tional entrepreneur on the innovation output is increasing in the number of capitalists,
and viceversa. In the next lemma, we prove that a higher input complementarity is
associated with a more persistent multiplier e¤ect. We are now ready to enunciate and
prove the following
Lemma 2. A higher input complementarity implies a more persistent multiplier
e¤ect in the sense that: (i) in the absence of input complementarity, the multiplier e¤ect
weakens as the market of innovation expands; (ii) input complementarity counteracts
the negative e¤ect of the market thickness on the strength of the multiplier e¤ect.
This input complementarity, that we may label technological, as it depends on
the functional form of (1), is distinct from the strategic complementarity identied in
Section 3. Strategic complementarity is a weaker concept than technological comple-
mentarity, in the sense that entrepreneurs and capitalists can be strategic complements
even when they are not complementary inputs in the matching function. The proof
of Lemma 1 shows that, in order for the entrepreneursreturn from entering into the
fair to be increasing in LK , it must only be that @M=@LK > 0 (and the same holds
when we consider the capitalistsreturn). In other words, strategic complementarity
requires function (1) to only exhibit positive marginal productivities in both inputs,
while technological complementarity further requires that these marginal productivites
be increasing in the use of the other input. As we have claried in the previous
lemma however, technological complementarity positively contributes to detemine the
"strength" of the strategic complementarity. This relation will be veried empirically
in Section 6.
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5 Coordination Failures in Entrepreneurial Activ-
ity
The presence of a thick market externality always raises the possibility of coordination
failures across the market participants (see for instance Diamond, 1982, 1984, Cooper
and John, 1988). In particular, if the complementarity between entrepreneurs and cap-
italists is strong enough which occurs when the matching function exhibits increasing
returns to scale , the model may generate multiple equilibria.
How do we interpret equilibrium multiplicity? For the sake of illustration, suppose
that the economy admits two (non-degenerate) equilibria, respectively denoted by su-
perscripts O,P , with (Li)
O > (Li)
P for i = E;K (an example of this kind is developed
at the end of this section). It is easy to interpret these two equilibria as self-fullling
equilibria triggered, respectively, by optimistic or pessimistic expectations. Whenever
entrepreneurs expect a high number of capitalists to be matched with (LeK = (LK)
O
where the superscript e stands for "expected"), their number will be high as well, (LE)
O.
Similarly, whenever capitalists expect a high number of entrepreneurs (LeE = (LE)
O),
their number will also be high, (LK)
O. Equilibrium O can be labelled as the optimistic
(or thick) equilibrium. Via a totally symmetric argument, expecting few entrepreneurs
and capitalists entering the market makes the agents converge towards the low-entry
equilibrium P , which can be referred to as the pessimistic (or thin) equilibrium.
Given that in our model only protable innovations are pursued, whenever multiple
equilibria exist, they can be Pareto-ordered from the lowest to the highest number of
innovations (matches) produced by the economy. Welfare is thus maximized at the
equilibrium characterized by the highest number of matches: all other equilibria are
sub-optimal and are the result of a coordination failure between entrepreneurs and
capitalists.
Our economy is also potentially subject to a most disruptive coordination failure.
If entrepreneurs expect no capitalist participating in the fair (LeK = 0), the number
of expected matches and thus the probability of matching a capitalist for an entrepre-
neur are both null (M (LE; 0) = 0, E = 0). As a result, the expected value from
participating in the fair is zero (V 1E = 0), implying no entrepreneur entering into the
market of innovation at equilibrium ((LE)
T = 0). Symmetrically, if capitalists expect
no entrepreneur at the fair of ideas (LeE = 0), none of them will participate either
((LK)
T = 0). The result of this extreme form of miscoordination is a (degenerate)
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equilibrium in which (LE)
T = (LK)
T = 0. We call this equilibrium a no-innovation
trap, as no innovation ever takes place in this economy.
The possibility of multiple equilibria provides an alternative explanation to the
strong space clusterization that we observe in entrepreneurial innovation. This is not
to deny the importance of fundamentals in explaining the di¤erent patterns of entrepre-
neurial behavior that we observe across di¤erent regions: for economic, institutional,
or even cultural reasons, some regions may simply provide more powerful incentives to
entrepreneurship. What we claim here is that, all other things equal, animal spirits
matter in entrepreneurial innovation, in the sense that, at least to a certain extent, a
favourable entrepreneurial climate (or the lack of it) may turn out to be self-fullling.
In this respect, the role of the policy maker might be crucial in providing a coordina-
tion device towards a path of bouncing entrepreneurial activity. Evidence on public
intervention across the developed world conrms this claim (Lerner, 2010). We come
back to this issue in the concluding section.
Example. Consider the model developed in Section 3 and further suppose that
(i) the matching function (1) is Cobb-Douglas with increasing returns to scale: M =
L
E
E L
K
K with  2 R+, E; K < 1 and E + K > 1, and that (ii) entry costs are
the same for every entrepreneur and every capitalist, cE and cK .16 This economy
admits three stationary equilibria. The rst (thin) equilibrium is given by the pair
(LE)
P ; (LK)
P

that solves the following system:178><>:
cE =
M
LE
+cE
r+ M
LE
+
cK =
M
LK
(1 )+cK
r+ M
LK
+1
:
The second (thick) equilibrium is instead given by the pair

(LE)
O ; (LK)
O

that
solves the system given by the two steady-state conditions:(
 (E   LE) = LEE LKK
K   LK = LEE LKK :
Finally, the third equilibrium is the (degenerate) no-innovation trap,

(LE)
T ; (LK)
T

=
(0; 0).
16In some respects, this example resembles the one developed by Diamond (1982) in Section IX.
17Under constant returns to scale, this system is impossible, and hence this equilibrium disappears.
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For illustrative purposes, let us carry out a numerical simulation of this economy.
First x these numerical values for the following parameters:18 E = 0:726, K = 0:438;
 = 0:046. Further assume r = 0:05,  = 100,  = 0:5;  = 1; cE = 30, cK = 35,
K = 400; E = 180.19
The rst system dening the thin equilibrium becomes8<: 30 =
0:046(LE)
 0:274(LK)0:43850+30
0:05+0:046(LE)
 0:274(LK)0:438+1
35 = 0:046(LE)
0:726(LK)
 0:56250+35
0:05+0:046(LE)
0:726(LK)
 0:562+1
whose solution is given by

(LE)
P ; (LK)
P

' (64; 41). The second system is instead
given by (
180  LE = 0:046 (LE)0:726 (LK)0:438
400  LK = 0:046 (LE)0:726 (LK)0:438 ;
whose solution is given by

(LE)
O ; (LK)
O

' (156; 376), which is the thick equilibrium.
Hence, this economy admits two non-degenerate equilibria plus the no-innovation trap.
6 Empirical Evidence
This section is devoted to the empirical validation of the main theoretical claims of
Sections 3, 4 and 5. We rst test the complementarity between entrepreneurs and
capitalists by directly estimating the aggregate matching function given in (1). We
then verify the empirical plausibility of the result of multiple equilibria by analyzing
the returns to scale of the estimated matching function.
6.1 Data
The matching function expresses the output -the number of innovations- as a positive
function of two inputs -the number of potential entrepreneurs and the number of cap-
italists. A key challenges of our analysis is the search of suitable data to estimate this
function. One of the two inputs, the "number of potential entrepreneurs", is partic-
ularly di¢ cult to measure. Usually, we observe the number of actual entrepreneurs,
18These numbers are drawn from a non-linear estimation of a Cobb-Douglas matching function
obtained using the same business angels dataset of Section 6 (but restricted to Europe only). The
estimates table is available upon request from the authors.
19The last two values are the average number of business angels and yearly submitted projects in
Europe.
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which is a proper subset of the group of those who are willing to become entrepreneurs
but may or may have not been nanced yet. The European Association for Business
Angels (EBAN) and the US Center for Venture Research (CVR) at the University of
New Hampshire, however, have recently started to collect more detailed yearly data,
at macro level, across angel investors. In particular, they both record the total num-
ber of entrepreneurial projects submitted to each business angel. We then use this
number of projects as a proxy for the number of potential entrepreneurs. Moreover,
EBAN and CVR collect yearly data on two other dimensions, which may well capture
our remaining two variables of interest: the number of business angels (as a proxy
for the input "number of capitalists"), and the number of deals (as a proxy for the
output "number of undertaken entrepreneurial projects"). We hand-collect data over
the three mentioned dimensions of the business angels activity across EU-15 countries,
plus Norway, Poland, Switzerland, Russia and the US over the period 1996-2010.20 A
summary description of these data is provided in Table 1.
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE
6.2 Complementarities in the Business Angels Market
Using the data illustrated above, we carry out a pooled regression estimation of di¤erent
specications for the matching function in order to estimate the existence and the
degree of complementarity between capitalists and entrepreneurs.
6.2.1 A CES-Type Matching Function
Theorem 1 has proven that entrepreneurs and capitalists are strategic complements.
This strategic complementarity arises because, as shown in Lemma 1, the return from
attending the fair of ideas for an entrepreneur (capitalist) is increasing in the number of
capitalists (entrepreneurs) attending the fair, whenever the matching function exhibits
positive marginal productivities in both inputs. Moreover, as proven in Lemma 2, the
20Data for European countries and the US are recorded in the annual reports compiled by, respec-
tively, EBAN and CVR (in particular, EBAN Annual Reports from 2005 to 2010, and CVR Angel
Market Activity Reports from 2003 to 2010). Note that these data cover most but not all the business
angels activity across the countries considered. The reason is that angel networks are not obliged to
release any data.
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degree of technological complementarity between two inputs - captured by the cross-
partial derivative of the matching function - strengthens the strategic complementarity
as the market of ideas develops, and it results in a more persistent multiplier e¤ect.
We now estimate a CES-type matching function and verify whether the marginal
productivities of both inputs and the cross-partial derivative are strictly positive. Con-
sider the following matching function:
Mit = A(E (LE)

it + K (LK)

it)
v
 exp(ccit + "it) (13)
whereMit is the number of deals in country i at time t; (LE)it and (LK)it are the number
of projects submitted and of business angels in country i at time t, respectively; cit is a
vector of controls; v is the return-to-scale parameter; E and K are share parameters,
A is a scale technology parameter. For this function, the (constant) Hicks elasticity
of substitution between the two input factors is given by  = 1= (1  ). The CES
collapses to a Cobb-Douglas function when  ! 1 (or,  ! 0).
In specication (13), the marginal return to Li is given by @M=@Li = AviL
 1
i (iL

i+
 iL

 i)
v

 1 exp(ccit+"it) (for i = E;K). Strategic complementarity requires E; K ; v; A >
0. The cross-partial derivative is instead given by
@M
@Li@L i
= Av (v   ) i i (LiL i) 1 (iLi +  iL i)
v

 2 exp(ccit + "it);
which is strictly positive if (v   ) > 0. Hence, a positive di¤erence between v and 
signals the existence of a technological complementarity between the two input levels.
The results from the nonlinear estimation of the log-CES matching function are
shown in Table 2.21 Estimates are in line with our theoretical predictions. Both
A and v, and the share parameters are signicantly positive. The same is true for
the estimated di¤erence between v and . Hence, the higher the number of business
angels, the greater (more positive) the e¤ect of the number of entrepreneurial projects
submitted on the innovation process, and viceversa. Or equivalently, the impact of one
additional project submitted on the number of deals is positive and increasing in the
number of business angels, and viceversa.
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE
21Estimates are computed using nonlinear least squares, and the residuals have an approximately
normal distribution.
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Our estimates also suggest a unitary elasticity of substitution between the two
inputs, because the  parameter is positive but not signicantly di¤erent from zero.
This brings us to consider, in the next subsection, a Cobb-Douglas specication of the
matching function.
6.2.2 A Cobb-Douglas Matching Function
Consider a Cobb-Douglas (CD) matching function of the following form:
Mit = A (LE)
E
it (LK)
K
it exp(ccit + "it):
Two inputs in a CD function are always complementary to the extent that the input
shares (E; K) are strictly positive.
22 We estimate the following log-transformation
of the CD matching function:
mit = 0 + E (lE)it + K (lK)it + ccit + "it (14)
where mit is the log of the number of deals in country i at time t; (lE)it and (lK)it are
the logs of the number of projects submitted and of the business angels in country i at
time t, respectively; cit is a vector of controls.
Model (14) is estimated via a robust regression to deal with the presence, in the
dataset, of outliers that can distort the ordinary least squares estimator (OLS). By
considering squared residuals, OLS tend to give an excessive importance to observa-
tions with very large residuals and, consequently, distort the parametersestimation
in presence of outliers. Adopting the graphical tool proposed by Rousseeuw and Van
Zomeren (1990), Figure 4 shows that several outliers are present, suggesting that there
is a serious risk that the OLS estimator be strongly attracted by outliers (Rousseeuw
and Leroy, 1987).23 To tackle this issue, and following the recent literature (Verardi
22The cross-partial derivative of the CD function writes as dM= (dLidL i) =
Ai iM= (LiL i) exp(ccit + "it), which is higher than zero as long as i > 0 for i = E;K.
23In particular, two observations for Belgium and Norway are bad leverage points, meaning that
their explanatory variables are slightly di¤erent from those of the rest of data and their outcomes
are higher than they should be according to the tted model. The collected data for US are large
good leverage points, suggesting that the characteristics of the US business angels market are rather
di¤erent from the other countries but that the number of deals is consistent with what the model
predicts. Finally, few other observations (i.e., for Italy, Portugal, Denmark, Netherlands and Poland)
are vertical outliers, being standard in their characteristics but more or less successful in terms of
number of deals than the model would suggest.
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and Croux, 2009), we adopt the MM-estimators method which has been found suitable
to combine a high resistance to outliers and high e¢ ciency.24
INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE
Estimation results of the log-linear CD matching function are shown in the rst
column of Table 3. The share parameters are both signicantly positive. In particular,
a 1% increase in the number of submitted projects (business angels) leads to a 0:53%
(0:55%) increase in the number of deals.
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE
We have so far veried the existence of a (strategic and technological) complemen-
tarity between the levels of the two inputs: a 1 unit increase in Li leads to an increase
in the output which is increasing in the level of the other input. By construction how-
ever, the log-linear Cobb-Douglas specication in (14) implicitly assumes a constant
elasticity of the output with respect to each input, that is to say: a 1% increase in Li
leads to a constant increase in the output. Indeed, this model neglects both market
size and input complementarity as forces that, as highlighted in Lemma 2, contribute
to determine the strength of the multiplier e¤ect in entrepreneurial activity. In the
next section, we consider two generalizations of model (14) that allow us to appreciate
the role of these two opposing forces for the dynamics of business angels market.
6.2.3 A Translog Matching Function
The rst generalization that we consider is a log-linear Cobb-Douglas with a log-
interaction term between the demand and the supply of nancial funds:
mit = 0 + E (lE)it + K (lK)it + EK [(lE)it  (lK)it] + ccit + "it; (15)
This model allows us to verify the existence of a technological complementarity in
elasticities, that is, to explicitly test whether a 1% increase in Li leads to an increase
24The intuition behind the method is simple. In the classical OLS estimation, the objective is to
minimize the variance of the residuals. Given that the variance is sensitive to outliers, this may result
in distorted OLS estimates. The class of robust S- and MM-estimators instead minimize a measure
of dispersion of the residuals that is less sensitive than the variance to extreme values.
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in the output which depends positively on the other input. This complementarity is
catpured by the coe¢ cient EK , which we expect to be strictly higher than zero.
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The second model we estimate is a trascendental logarithmic (translog) function,
which generalizes the log-Cobb-Douglas form by allowing the output elasticity with
respect to each input to vary with the size of both input shares:26
mit = 0 + E (lE)it + K (lK)it + EK [(lE)it  (lK)it] + (16)
+EE [(lE)it]
2 + KK [(lK)it]
2 + ccit + "it
The translog considers the squares of the two log-inputs. Decreasing elasticity for
both inputs would imply EE; KK < 0.
The four models that we have estimated are all closely related to each other. The
log-linear CD matching function (14) is nested into the interaction-augmented log-
linear CD matching function (15), which is nested into the translog specication (16).
In particular, (14) and (15) are directly obtained from (16) by applying the following
restrictions, respectively: EK = EE = KK = 0 and EE = KK = 0. Finally, it
can be demonstrated that the translog specication can be obtained from a second-
order Taylor approximation of the logarithmic transformation of the CES specication
(13).27
As with model (14), also (15) and (16) are estimated via robust regressions. Results
are shown in columns (2) and (3) of Table 3. The estimated elasticities of the matching
function all have the expected signs and are highly statistically signicant.
In column 2, the interaction term between the logarithms of the two explanatory
variables is positive and highly statistically signicant, which suggests the existence
of an input complementarity, not only between the levels of BAs and entrepreneurial
projects, but also between their elasticities. In other words, the impact of a 1% increase
in the number of business angels on the number of deals is positive and increasing with
the number of entrepreneurial projects, and viceversa.
25The cross-partial derivative is given by dm=dlidl i = EK , which is strictly positive if and only
if EK > 0.
26The scale elasticity of a translog is dened by  = E + K , where E = E + EK (lK)it +
2EE (lE)it is the elasticity of new deals with respect to the number of submitted projects, and
K = K +EK (lE)it + 2KK (lK)it is the elasticity of new deals with respect to the number of BAs.
27When the elasticity of substitution is in the neighborhood of unity, a two-input CES function may
be approximated by a Taylor expansion which has the form of (16) under the following restrictions:
EK =  2EE =  2KK (Kmenta, 1967).
23
Given that the log-linear CD specication is nested in the interaction-augmented
log-linear CD specication and that the latters parameter estimates are all signicant,
we conclude that model (15) is to be preferred to model (14). Notice also that, moving
from the rst to the second specication leads to a signicant reduction in the estimated
rst-order elasticity of the number of deals to the number of entrepreneurs (which drops
to 0:27%). This means that, in the simplest specication, the estimated elasticity of
mit to lE erroneously captures the positive role of the omitted interaction term.
The best t is obtained under model (16), which estimates the more general translog
matching function. Moving from model (15) to model (16), the role of the rst-order
terms on the outcome of interest remains substantially unchanged, while the impact of
the interaction term signicantly improves, going from 0:02% to 0:31%. This change
is accompanied by a signicant and negative impact of the squared values of the two
inputs, thus conrming our conjecture of diminishing elasticities for both inputs.
In sum, our results support the theoretical claims contained in Lemma 2, in that (i)
the elasticity of new deals with respect to the number of projects (or, with respect to the
number of BAs) is decreasing in the number of competitors, as shown by the negative
signs of EE and KK ; (ii) the degree of technological complementarity between the
two inputs - captured by the positive sign of EK - attenuates the negative e¤ect of
the size of the market of innovation on entrepreneurial activity.
Finally, we test the robustness of our previous empirical ndings by introducing
a few control variables in the cit vector of controls. In particular, we consider the
two following World Bank Indicators: i) the value of the market capitalization of listed
companies in percentage of GDP (MC); (ii) the amount of the domestic credit provided
by the banking sector in percentage of GDP (DC). Stock market capitalization should
have a positive e¤ect on BA activity (because a well-developed stock market facilitates
the exit of the business angels through IPOs). On the other hand, a mostly bank-based
nancial sector is usually seen as detrimental to entrepreneurial innovation. Results,
shown in Table 4, are substantially similar to our previous ndings. The coe¢ cients of
the controls all have the expected signs, and the stock market capitalization seems to
signicantly a¤ect the (log-)number of deals.
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE
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6.3 Equilibrium Multiplicity in the Business Angels Market
As proven in Theorem 2, constant returns to scale of the matching function imply that
the equilibrium is unique. We now test the returns to scale (RTS) of this function in
order to verify whether one or more than one equilibrium is to be expected in the BA
market.
Table 2 presents the estimated returns to scale for the CES matching function and
the results of an F-test for the null hypothesis of constant returns to scale (v = 1).
Following Yashiv (2000) and Warren (1996), the last rows of both tables 3 and 4
present the estimated RTS at the sample mean of the explanatory variables and the
results of the F-test for the null hypothesis of constant returns to scale (CRS) of the
respective log-linear matching function specication (for the translog model, the null
hypothesis implies the following three linear restrictions on the parameters: E +K =
1, EE + EK = 0, KK + EK = 0).
Overall, our results suggest that returns to scale are either constant or slightly
increasing. The nonlinear estimation of the log-CES matching function (Table 2) gives
us an estimated scale elasticity signicantly positive and in the neighborhood of 1.
The null hypothesis of constant returns to scale cannot be rejected. Moving to the log-
linear matching function specications without further control variables (Table 3), our
evidence supports the presence of increasing returns to scale of the estimated matching
function. In particular, in the translog model the output elasticity evaluated at the
sample mean of explanatory variables is around 1:06, and the null hypothesis of CRS
is rejected at 99%. When the selected World Bank Indicators are added among the
control variables (Table 4), the translog model continues to exhibit mildly increasing
returns to scale of the order of 1:01, but the null hypothesis of CRS cannot be rejected.
7 Conclusions and Policy Implications
This paper has built a model of the market for innovation that focuses on the rela-
tionship between innovators and nanciers. An innovation is the outcome of a search
and matching process between an innovator with a new project and a nancier backing
that project. The model has investigated the choice of innovators and nanciers as to
whether or not to participate in a "fair of innovation" and has determined the equilib-
rium number of innovators and nanciers contributing to the innovation process along
the steady state. The main purpose of the modeling strategy that we have followed
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has been the one of representing the "venture capital cycle" described in the literature
on entrepreneurial nance (Gompers and Lerner, 1999).
We have shown that a strategic complementarity exists between innovators and
nanciers, in that an increase in participation of the former induces an increase in
participation of the latter (and viceversa). Two main implications are drawn on this
basis. First, the innovation process is subject to a multiplier e¤ect which magnies
the e¤ects of any shock on the innovative performance of the system. Secondly, co-
ordination failures between innovators and nanciers may occur, which are driven by
pessimistic beliefs about the attendance of the fair of innovation. These two results
may contribute to explain the concentration of the entrepreneurial activity in both
space and time that we observe in the real world.
Using data on the business angel market for the period 1996-2010 across a group of
European countries plus the US, our empirical analysis has conrmed that the number
of angel investors looking for promising entrepreneurial projects to nance and the
number of projects submitted to them are complementary. We have then veried
the empirical plausibility of the multiple equilibria by testing the returns to scale of
the matching function. In the most reliable model (the translog specication), the
estimated scale elasticity of the matching function is slightly above unity, suggesting
that multiple equilibria are not unlikely.
Three main policy implications may be drawn from our analysis. First, government
intervention may be useful in the form of a "stabilization policy", that is, in order
to attenuate the pronounced cyclicality of entrepreneurial innovation that we have
documented above and that, according to our theory, originates from the presence
of a multiplier e¤ect in this process. Secondly, given that our model of innovation
admits the possibility of coordination failures -that is, of equilibria characterized by
sub-optimally low paces of innovation-, an e¤ective government intervention might be
able to initiate a virtuous cycle, that is, to favor the coordination of economic agents
towards a path of faster innovation. For instance, public policy could in principle help
drive the economy out of "bad equilibria" (such as the "no-innovation trap"). This
task may not be as easy as it appears from a theoretical model: the policy maker might
be incompetent or captured by special interests. Yet, empirical evidence conrms that,
behind every successful story of entrepreneurial innovation (from the Silicon Valley to
the Singapore VC industry), the role of public policy has always been crucial at the
very early stages of development. In the words of Lerner (2010, p.42), "every hub of
cutting-edge entrepreneurial activity in the world today had its origins in proactive
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government intervention. Similarly, the venture capital industry in many nations has
been profoundly shaped by government intervention".
This, however, does not imply that a simple "big push" strategy is the best innova-
tion policy that a public authority can implement, which brings us to the third policy
implication. Our model has allowed us to assess the role of the nancier not only as
someone who provides innovators with the necessary funds, but also as someone who
actively participates in the innovation process by evaluating and selecting potentially
protable ideas. Given that the government is likely to be less skillful than professional
nanciers in this function, its most valuable task is probably not the one of nancing
directly entrepreneursideas, but rather the one of fostering the emergence of a class
of active capitalists, so as to exploit their expertise in terms of selection of the most
promising innovative ventures.
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A Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. Di¤erentiating (7) with respect to LK , we obtain
d (V 1E   V 0E)
dLK
=
@ (V 1E   V 0E)
@E
 @E
@LK
=
r + 
0B@F (cE) 
cEZ
0
cEdF (cE)
1CA
[r + E + F (cE)]
2 
1
LE
@M
@LK
;
which is always strictly positive, given that rational entrepreneurs pursue protable
projects ( > cE), and that the marginal productivity of capitalists is strictly positive
(@M=@LK > 0). This completes the proof of the rst part of the theorem.
To prove the second part of the theorem, an entirely analogous argument can be
developed starting from the di¤erentiation of (8) with respect to LE. We omit it for
brevity.
Proof of Theorem 1. We prove this statement via a simple reductio ad absurdum
argument.28 An initial increase in Li cannot be followed by a (weak) decrease in L i
(8i = E;K) if we want the 4 expressions (9), (10), (11), (12) dening the stationary
equilibrium to hold all at the same time.
Suppose instead that, following an increase in LK , LE has diminished (a totally
symmetric argument can be developed for the opposite case). From equation (9) (cE =
cE

+
E

= cE

+
LK ;
 
LE

) and from equation (10) (cK = c

K

+
K

= cK
  
LK ;
+
LE

),
we then know for sure that, respectively, cE has increased and c

K has decreased. If we
now equalize the left-hand sides (LHS) of equations (11) and (12) (which we can do,
given that the right-hand side (RHS) of these equations coincide), we obtain
 (1  LE)F (cE) = (K   LK)G (cK) :
The increase in LK and the decrease in cK both imply that the RHS of the equation
above (and hence the number of matches) has decreased. On the other hand, the
decrease in LE and the increase in cE both imply that the LHS of the equation above
(and hence the number of matches) has increased. These two statements exclude
each other. A situation of a decrease in LE following an increase in LK is then in
contradiction with the denition of stationary equilibrium for this economy.
28An alternative, computationally more cumbersome, proof strategy exists that requires the explicit
calculation of dLi=dL i.
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Proof of Theorem 2. We here prove that, if the matching function exhibits
constant returns to scale (CRS), the stationary equilibrium is unique. First pose 
 
LK=LE. Given that (1) has CRS, we can write E  M=LE = m (
), and K 
M=LK = (1=
)m (
). The entry conditions, (9) and (10), are then both functions of

 only, the former increasing, the latter decreasing, that is, cE

+



and cK
 



. By
substituting these functions respectively into (11) and (12), we obtain
 (1  LE)F (cE (
))  LEm (
) = 0 (17)
and
(K   LK)G (cK (
))  LK (1=
)m (
) = 0: (18)
Standard di¤erential calculus proves that LE (
) dened in (17) is monotone increasing
in 
, while LK (
) dened in (18) is monotone decreasing in 
. Hence, the function
dened as the ratio between them, LK=LE is unambiguously decreasing in 
. Given
that it is 
  LK=LE, a stationary equilibrium is a xed point of function LK=LE (
).
We now prove that this function admits one and only one xed point.
Dene g (
)  LK=LE (
)   
. There exist su¢ ciently low values of 
 such that
g (
) > 0, as well as su¢ ciently high values of 
 such that g (
) < 0.29 Given that
g (
) is a continuous and monotone decreasing function in 
, the intermediate value
theorem guarantees the existence of one and only one 
 such that g (
) = 0, that is,
such that LK=LE (
) = 
. Finally, it might still be the case that multiple equilibria
exist, even though they are all characterized by a unique ratio 
. This instance,
however, can be excluded once we realize that LE (
) and LK (
), dened in (17) and
(18), are monotone functions of 
.
Proof of Theorem 3. Dene Li (L i; ) as the implicit function of Li, for i = E;K
and where  parameterizes this function. By convention, suppose that @Li=@ > 0.
Then it is
dLE
d
=
@LE
@
+
dLE
dLK
dLK
d
:
29The standard assumptions on the matching function imply that
lim

!0
LK
LE
(
) = +1
and
lim

!+1
LK
LE
(
) = 0:
Even though they are not necessary, these two results ensure the existence of the two regions where
g (
) > 0 and g (
) < 0.
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On the other hand,
dLK
d
=
@LK
@
+
dLK
dLE
dLE
d
:
Substituting the second expression into the rst, we obtain
dLE
d
=
1
1  dLE
dLK
dLK
dLE

@LE
@
+
dLE
dLK
@LK
@

>
@LE
@
;
given that @LK=@ > 0 and that -as ensured in Theorem 1- dLi=dL i > 0 for i = E;K.
Proof of Lemma 2. As shown in the proof of Theorem 3, the size of the multiplier
e¤ect positively depends on the slopes of the two reaction functions, dLE=dLK and
dLK=dLE. Focus on the slope of the entrepreneurs reaction function which, after
rearranging, can be written as30
dLE
dLK
=
@E
@LK

dLE
dcE
dcE
dE
+ dLE
dE

1  dLE
dcE
dcE
dE
@E
@LE
;
where @E=@LK = 1=LE  @M=@LK > 0, @E=@LE =  1=L2E M + 1=LE  @M=@LE <
0, and dLE=dE =  LE= (F (cE) + E) < 0. The expression above can be easily
interpreted: the numerator represents the positive e¤ect that LK exerts on LE (via its
direct and indirect inuence on E). This positive e¤ect is, however, partly weakened
by the negative e¤ect that the resulting increase in the number of entrepreneurs LE has
on their own matching probability (@E=@LE < 0). This attenuating e¤ect is captured
by the denominator (which is, in fact, strictly higher than 1).
To study how the multiplier varies with the thickness of the market, we now derive
the expression above with respect to LK and obtain
d2LE
dL2K
=
dLE
dcE
dcE
dE
@E
@LE@LK
1  dLE
dcE
dcE
dE
@E
@LE
2 @E@LK

dLE
dcE
dcE
dE
+
dLE
dE

(19)
+
@2E
@L2K
1  dLE
dcE
dcE
dE
@E
@LE

dLE
dcE
dcE
dE
+
dLE
dE

;
where
@E
@LE@LK
=   1
L2E
 @M
@LK
+
1
LE
 @M
@LE@LK
;
30This expression is obtained by totally deriving (11) with respect to LK (taking into account that
LK enters indirectly into (11) via cE and E).
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and
@2E
@L2K
=
1
LE
 @
2M
@L2K
:
Notice that the second addend in (19) is always negative when the marginal pro-
ductivity of capitalists is decreasing (@2M=@L2K < 0). The sign of the rst ad-
dend, instead, only depends on the cross-partial derivative of the matching probability
(@E=@LE@LK).
We are now ready to prove both statements in Lemma 2. First, no input comple-
mentarity requires a cross-partial derivative of the matching function equal or lower
than zero (@M=@LE@LK  0). This implies that both addends in (19) are negative,
and hence that the slope of the reaction function monotically decreases as the size of the
market of ideas increases. Secondly, expression (19) is strictly increasing in the cross-
partial derivative of the matching function, thus implying that input complementarity
counteracts the negative e¤ect of the market thickness on the slope of the entrepre-
neursreaction function. The fact that a totally analogous reasoning can be developed
for the capitalistsreaction function, and that the multiplier depends positively on the
slopes of the two reaction functions, completes the proof.
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No. Deals No. Angels No. Projects Obs.
mean sd mean sd mean sd
Austria 5 3 79 30 63 21 10
Belgium 29 17 142 136 197 105 9
Switzerland 6 2 206 162 160 108 4
Germany 18 10 145 59 147 109 7
Denmark 17 29 76 86 38 30 4
Catalonia (Spain) 16 10 251 173 227 109 8
Finland 8 5 185 127 35 13 10
France 206 69 2563 877 833 259 4
Greece 1 1 11 3 8 4 5
Italy 8 9 252 96 153 139 7
Luxembourg 1 0 8 0 30 0 1
Netherlands 48 26 367 554 174 82 10
Norway 3 1 101 72 32 13 4
Poland 4 2 56 28 100 83 4
Portugal 3 4 117 151 137 258 6
Russia 3 1 88 46 35 7 2
Sweden 43 28 284 157 358 306 4
United Kingdom 78 73 1444 1663 369 214 13
USA 50914 8157 238820 22876 370787 115773 9
All countries 3815 13571 18140 63099 27746 102121 121
Table 1: Summary statistics.
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log-CES
ln(A) 0.9358
(0.3136)
K 0.0967**
(0.0057)
E 0.9033***
(0.0057)
v 0.9200**
(0.0258)
 0.5161
(0.1799)
Year controls YES
Country controls YES
N 116
R-squared 0.95
(v   ) > 0 p-value 0.0147
 ! 0 p-value 0.2135
CRS p-value 0.1987
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2: Results of the nonlinear estimation of the log-CES matching function.
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(1) (2) (3)
log-CD log-CD with translog
interaction
Elasticities Elasticities Elasticities
K 0.5517** 0.5672*** 0.6087***
(0.2214) (0.0380) (0.0896)
E 0.5362*** 0.2689*** 0.3264***
(0.1843) (0.0535) (0.0609)
EK 0.0154*** 0.3074***
(0.0030) (0.0425)
KK -0.1356***
(0.0246)
EE -0.1612***
(0.0204)
Year controls YES YES YES
Country controls YES YES YES
N 116 116 116
R-squared 0.92 0.92 0.90
RTS 1.09 1.00 1.06
CRS p-value 0.0372 0.8925 0.0017
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3: Results of the estimations of the log-log matching function specications.
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(1) (2) (3)
log-CD log-CD with translog
interaction
Elasticities Elasticities Elasticities
K 0.1690* 0.4242*** 0.5304***
(0.0909) (0.1488) (0.1748)
E 0.8198*** 0.4403*** 0.3326**
(0.0761) (0.1340) (0.1360)
EK 0.0101*** 0.2627***
(0.0031) (0.0460)
KK -0.1156***
(0.0375)
EE -0.1347***
(0.0208)
DC -0.0006 0.0025 0.0021
(0.0014) (0.0017) (0.0021)
MC 0.0065*** 0.0042*** 0.0034***
(0.0021) (0.0014) (0.0007)
Year controls YES YES YES
Country controls YES YES YES
N 114 114 114
R-squared 0.92 0.93 0.92
RTS 0.99 0.97 1.01
CRS p-value 0.6971 0.4483 0.8907
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4: Results of the estimations of the log-log matching function specications
(continued).
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Figure 1. Volatility of investments in fixed capital and in R&D, years 1995-2010.  
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Note: The value of US investments in R&D for the year 2010 is still missing from the OECD database. 
Source: Own elaborations from OECD.Stat. 
 
 
Figure 2. Volatility of investments in fixed capital and in R&D, and volatility of 
investments in seed-and start-ups provided by Venture Capitalists (VC) and Private 
Equity (PE) funds, years 1995-2010.  
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Note: The value of US investments in R&D for the year 2010 is still missing from the OECD database. 
Source: Own elaborations from OECD.Stat, MoneyTree Report, EBAN Annual Reports. 
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Figure 3. Volatility of investments in fixed capital and in R&D, and volatility of 
investment funds provided by business angels (BA), years 2001-2010.  
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Note: The value of US investments in R&D for the year 2010 is still missing from the OECD database. 
Source: Own elaborations from OECD.Stat, MoneyTree Report, CVR Angel Market Activity Reports. 
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Figure 4. Diagnostic plot of standardized robust residuals versus robust Mahalanobis 
distance of the vector of covariates from the vector of their means. 
 
AT
BE
CH
CH
DK
IT
IT
IT
NL
NO
PO
PT PT
USA
USA
USAUSA
USA
USAUSAUSA
-1
0
-5
0
5
1
0
R
o
b
u
s
t 
s
ta
n
d
a
rd
iz
e
d
 r
e
s
id
u
a
ls
0 2 4 6 8 10
Robust_distance
 
 
Note. The Mahalanobis distance of a multivariate vector x of p1  dimension with mean vector  and 
covariance matrix  is defined as:      μxΣμx  1TxD , which follows a chi-squared distribution 
with p degree of freedom under normality. Observations lying at the right hand side of the vertical limit (set 
at 
2
975.0,p ) are defined as good leverage points. Their presence does not affect the OLS-estimation but it 
affects the statistical inference since they do deflate the estimated standard errors. Observations lying above 
or below the area delimited by the two horizontal limits (set at -2.25 and +2.25, respectively) are defined as 
vertical outliers and affect the estimated intercept of an OLS-estimation. Observations lying both at the 
right hand side of the vertical limit and outside the 95% confidence interval of the Standard Normal are 
considered bad leverage points. Their presence significantly affects the OLS-estimates of both the intercept 
and the slope. 
 
 
